

















The debate over the constitutional recognition of Indigenous 
peoples in Australia should be seen as a deeply political one. That 
might appear to be a controversial claim. After all, there has been 
much talk about minimising the scope for disagreement between 
‘constitutional conservatives’ and supporters of more expansive 
constitutional recognition. And there is concern to ensure that 
any potential referendum enjoys the maximum conditions and 
opportunity for success.
However, my argument shall be that any form of constitutional 
recognition of Australia’s First Peoples needs to be seen as part of 
an ongoing transformation in the relations between Indigenous 
peoples and the Australian state. I do not underestimate the huge 
practical and political challenges of amending the Australian 
Constitution given its history and the nature of its provisions. And I 
well understand the considerations that are required to undertake 
a referendum in Australia, given how rarely they succeed (only 8 
out of 44 since Federation).1 So I am very sympathetic to those 
who must make a complex set of judgments about when and 
how the referendum should occur. 
But there is a danger in confusing the referendum process and 
its outcome with the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
establishing a just set of relations between Indigenous peoples 
and the state. To not seek to understand and address these deeper 
political claims would not only be an opportunity missed, but 
unjust. And it would not only be unjust from the perspective of 
Indigenous peoples, but also on the basis of the very grounds 
upon which liberal democratic political orders—like Australia—
claim their legitimacy. We need to shift the perspective and overall 
frame within which we understand claims for recognition in these 
contexts. The justificatory onus is not on Indigenous peoples, 
but on the state, especially when it is a self-consciously liberal 
democratic one. In this paper I want to explore the philosophical 
basis of this perspective shift and why it is necessary.
There are two crucial elements to my argument. The first is to 
explore the relationship between legitimacy and justice. In recent 
political theory, there is a tendency to see these two concepts 
as either synonymous, or radically distinct. Neither position is 
correct. Legitimacy and justice are interdependent, but not 
synonymous. However, it is important to understand the nature 
of this interdependency. This is particularly important with regard 
to the relations between Indigenous peoples and settler states. 
The coercive powers of the state are justified only to the extent 
that they provide the conditions within which justice can be 
provided for the members of that community. The conundrum 
is this: a Constitution may be considered legitimate because its 
procedures and processes are endorsed by the majority, despite 
producing unjust laws and outcomes. But laws and outcomes that 
are considered just may also be illegitimate, especially if they are 
imposed without due consideration for the standing and agency 
of those subject to them. What is the best way of making sense of 
this tension between legitimacy and justice?
There are at least two ways in which the apparently justified 
coercive power of the state can become illegitimate. The first is 
that the state and its agencies consistently produce distributive 
outcomes that undermine the basic freedom and equality of 
particular members of that community. (Of course, there are 
different ways of understanding what a just distributive outcome 
should be. I leave aside those specifics here.) The second way 
justified authority becomes merely coercive is when the operation 
of its constitutional procedures and processes, respect for and the 
standing of the basic moral and political agency of members of that 
community are either ignored or are denied in various ways. These 
two critical elements of liberal democratic justice—distributive 
equality and respect for the political agency of the members of 
the community—are the focus of my discussion here.
The reason equality and agency are so important in the case 
of Indigenous peoples is that they present two of the most 
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them and liberal settler states. It almost goes without saying that 
Indigenous peoples are among those who suffer from the worst 
distributive outcomes in our community today—for example, in 
terms of life expectancy, overrepresentation in the criminal justice 
system and health and educational outcomes overall. And respect 
for, as well as acknowledgement of, the distinct moral and political 
agency of Indigenous peoples within the constitutional and 
political structures of Australia remains unresolved.
Of course, the distributive and agency aspects of justice are deeply 
connected. The reason why Indigenous peoples have suffered from 
terrible distributive outcomes stems in part from the formal and 
informal discrimination that has been imposed on them by the 
state since settlement. It has not simply been the lack of formal 
recognition of their collective political agency, but the proactive 
denial of that agency, that has undermined their wellbeing. The 
capacities of individuals and communities to gain access to and 
develop their fair share of what John Rawls calls the ‘primary 
goods’ in his book Justice as Fairness: A Restatement—that is, those 
fundamental goods required to live a decent life (resources, basic 
liberties, equality of opportunity)—have been regularly denied and 
undermined through formal and informal means.2
All states are to some degree unjust and illegitimate, just because 
justice and legitimacy can never be settled at one point in time, 
once and for all (this is a very general point, but an important one 
that I will return to in my conclusion). However, there comes a 
time when the illegitimacy of the political constitution and the 
procedures it endorses threatens to undermine the distributive 
outcomes it produces. Similarly, there comes a point where the 
unjustness of the outcomes threatens the very legitimacy of the 
political order that produces them. I believe we are at such a 
crossroads in Australia today.
LIBERALISM AND THE CHALLENGE OF HISTORIC
There are two familiar responses among contemporary political 
philosophers to the challenges outlined above. The first is that 
they demonstrate the fundamental moral and political complicity 
of liberal political theory and the liberal state with imperialism and 
colonial domination. The most powerful versions of this argument 
have come from Indigenous political theorists, which I shall explore 
in a moment.3 The second response is that, in fact, there is no special 
problem here for liberal political theory to deal with: it represents 
a spectacular failure in practice (and perhaps exposes the limits of 
the historical context within which liberalism was developing), but 
not with liberal principles or concepts themselves.4
I think this second response is too complacent. But I also 
believe it ’s possible that in reflecting on the history of 
liberalism’s entanglement with colonialism, we can reshape 
some of our master concepts and practices to at least address 
the fundamental challenges colonialism poses to the self-
understanding of liberal political communities. Two of the most 
important concepts in this regard are recognition and justification. 
These are two of the most dominant modes of dealing with 
questions of the legitimacy and justice of liberal political 
orders. They constitute two of the most influential ‘moves’ in the 
language game of contemporary liberal justice. As I have argued 
above, Indigenous peoples’ claims for recognition presents a 
deep challenge to liberalism, namely: how can the legitimacy 
and justice of liberal political orders be redeemed in the presence 
of deep and ongoing historical injustices?5
Before turning to the concepts of recognition and justification 
directly, we need to understand the sense in which injustices are 
said to be ongoing or enduring.6 The challenge is grasping the 
extent to which historic injustices continue to shape not only 
the distribution of ‘primary goods’, but also the meaning and 
equal value of those very goods (as well as the boundaries of the 
political community within which they are to be distributed).7 So 
how do past injustices continue to shape the present, especially 
one in which a political community has embraced conceptions of 
democratic citizenship as a central aspect of its collective political 
identity? We might fail to live up to those ideals in a myriad of ways, 
so one argument goes, but they still continue to serve as normative 
benchmarks against which we judge the outcomes of our political 
processes—including (and especially) for the most vulnerable and 
marginal members of the society. The question then becomes: how 
do historic injustices undermine the value of democratic equality?
Of course, you might reject the claim that historic injustices do 
actually possess the kind of moral and political significance I am 
suggesting they have in this case. Jeremy Waldron, for example, 
has argued that in some contexts, after a certain point, historical 
injustices can become ‘superseded’.8 According to Waldron, the 
changes in social, economic and political circumstances over time, 
and especially since settlement, are such that there is no plausible 
way of restoring a state of affairs that has been deeply disrupted 
by colonialism, without possibly generating more (contemporary) 
injustice in the process. Indeed, some have argued that this is 
It has not simply been the lack of 
formal recognition of their collective 
political agency, but the proactive 
denial of that agency, that has 
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precisely the case with regard to at least the legal circumstances 
of the settlement of Australia. How could the Australian state 
reverse the circumstances of its own founding? The problem 
with this argument, however, is that it tends to assume that the 
rather narrow conditions in which supersession might occur 
(for example, an original theft now incorporated into radically 
different circumstances) applies generally to the colonisation of 
a territory.9 It also presupposes that nothing further can be done 
to address the original injustice. One doesn’t have to believe that 
justice is impervious to changes in circumstances, to think that 
this still leaves open considerable scope for the political claims 
of Indigenous peoples. And yet, there remains a key point worth 
considering at the heart of the supersession argument: to what 
extent does the legitimacy of a political order turn on its origins, 
as opposed to its present behaviour?10 This returns us to the 
question of the relation between legitimacy and justice. If liberal 
political orders are to be justified on terms that those subject to 
the coercive powers of that order could not reasonably reject,11 
then historic injustices matter insofar as they shape the contours 
of the justificatory game within which struggles for recognition 
take place. I will return to this point below.
GAMES OF RECOGNITION AND JUSTIFICATION
I want to look more closely now at what I am calling the ‘recognition 
game’ in liberal political theory.
According to the liberal version of this approach, we can only 
become a truly self-conscious and self-determining agent when 
we enjoy the mutual recognition of other, similarly constituted 
beings.12 At the heart of this account of recognition is a claim for 
mutual respect: individuals (and groups), understood to be both 
fundamentally free and equal, are owed respect, which is reflected 
and made ma ifest through genuine mutual recognition. 
Misrecognition, then, is a form of disrespect, and more strongly, 
denotes an absence of genuine mutual esteem. Depending on 
the theorist, misrecognition then results in at least two possible 
outcomes. First, it undermines an individual’s (or group’s) capacity 
for self-development and autonomous agency, because they 
internalise perceptions of inferior social worth and inequality.13 
And second, it reinforces existing structural and material 
inequalities that impede the equal participation of minority 
groups in democratic institutions (whatever their internal 
subjective mental states).14 The first represents a psychological 
account of the role of recognition (and misrecognition) in politics. 
The second focuses on the way struggles over recognition reflect 
deeper, more fundamental material and structural inequalities 
that block equal participation.
Regardless of which strand of this discourse on recognition 
one endorses, it has become one of the master concepts for 
understanding struggles for minority rights—including Indigenous 
peoples’ claims—more generally. However, I want to argue that 
it plays too dominant a role as a framework for addressing these 
issues. In fact, this is one of the conclusions we should draw in 
reflecting seriously on the history of Indigenous peoples’ claims 
within liberal democratic states.
There are at least two main lines of critique here. First, the focus 
on recognition often misconstrues the motives and aims of social 
and political actors in political struggles. Recognition is often part 
of what is at stake, but it shouldn’t be seen as the privileged driver 
of all social and cultural interaction (pace Honneth). In the most 
psychologically focused accounts of recognition, these struggles 
become dominated by the quality of the individual’s sense of 
self-respect or esteem vis-a-vis their recognition by others. But this 
overemphasises the need for mutual recognition as a condition 
for effective political agency. At the very least, history suggests 
that individuals and groups form a sense of their own identity and 
self-worth both prior to and in the midst of often deeply unequal 
struggles for justice. After all, Hegel’s slave ultimately gains his 
freedom only after turning away from his master and focusing on 
his own work. In short: the sense of who I am (or we are) depends 
neither morally nor practically upon recognition by the majority, or 
at least not primarily so. And nor should the aim of such struggles 
be for mutual esteem—the conditions for which are extremely 
demanding in the context of social and cultural pluralism—but 
rather to be respected as political equals. I shall return to this 
distinction in a moment.
The second line of critique is more specific. The crucial question 
here is: who is recognising whom, and on what basis? Casting the 
claims of Indigenous peoples as claims for recognition by the state, 
or the broader political community, can become something of a 
trap or, at the very least, a dead end.
Among the most powerful versions of this critique are those 
developed recently by a number of Indigenous political theorists. 
Each takes a slightly different tack, but focus in on a similar set of 
concerns. If it is fundamental to the liberal versions of the recognition 
game—especially those inspired by Hegel’s master/slave 
dialectic—that the recognition that occurs between individuals 
How can the legitimacy and 
justice of liberal political orders be 
redeemed in the presence of deep 
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(and groups) must be genuinely mutual, then colonialism renders 
this impossible. Franz Fanon, in his masterpiece Black Skin, White 
Masks, provided a devastating version of this argument: the 
colonial master is not dependent on the slave, as Hegel thought 
(paradoxically), for securing his own self-consciousness, but rather 
needs his work (and crucially, his territory).15 The colonial subject, 
in turn, subjects themself to a regime of recognition in which 
he internalises the gaze of the coloniser and thus the discipline 
they impose on his desires, as well as the conceptual schemes 
and values imposed on the interpretation of his political and 
cultural structures. As Audra Simpson puts it, this means that the 
production of anthropological and political knowledge about 
Indigenous people ends up being wed ‘elegantly, effortlessly and 
very cleanly’ to the imperatives of the colonial project and the desire 
for territory.16 This can result in deeply divisive, overlapping and 
enduring injustices within Indigenous communities as well. The 
situation of Aboriginal women in Australia and Canada, for example, 
is one such example. The effects of a racist and patriarchal Canadian 
Indian Act, combined with diminished territory and constrained 
rights of self-government, ends up generating yet more grounds 
for legislative intervention in Aboriginal communities—which, 
in turn, generates new conflicts and divisions therein. As Glen 
Coulthard well summarises it, this results in the absurd paradox of 
the injustices of colonialism generating the grounds for yet more 
colonialist interventions.17
What these critiques have exposed is the ‘sting in the tail of 
recognition’: to seek recognition is to seek to be valued by others, 
which unavoidably involves a critical evaluation and judgment 
about the beliefs and practices of the person (or people ) making 
the claim.18 Interestingly, this formed a major part of Charles Taylor’s 
original and influential essay on the ‘Politics of Recognition’, but has 
been less prominent in subsequent debates. For Taylor, the demand 
for recognition also called for an expansion of our horizons of 
mutual understanding, as well as our beliefs about the presumptive 
worth of what other cultures had to offer.19 But in colonial contexts, 
this generous and inclusive spirit struggles to overcome the deep 
historic legacies of domination and exclusion. The ‘recogniser’ 
inevitably exercises considerable power over the ‘recognisee’ in 
being the one with the capacity to grant recognition. In fact, it’s 
difficult to make sense of recognition being something that one 
can demand in the first place, as if it were a right that triggered 
a necessary obligation.20 The conditions that attend genuine 
recognition make it difficult to be interpreted as something akin 
to a rights claim.
This challenge becomes particularly acute if mutual recognition 
requires recognition and mediation through the state, as Coulthard 
and Simpson have argued so powerfully. If the legitimacy of the 
state is under serious question given the ongoing injustices of 
enduring colonial practices, attitudes and institutions, then the 
conditions for genuine mutuality and respect are absent. Thus 
the legacy and continuing reality of enduring injustices render 
the politics of recognition deeply problematic, both in terms of its 
explanatory power and as an appropriate normative framework 
for constitutional and political reform.
The critique of recognition has led Indigenous and other political 
theorists to increasingly turn towards other explanatory and 
normative frameworks, including a self-conscious reconstitution 
of Indigenous identities and ways of life as independently as 
possible from the liberal settler state. This often takes the form of 
a refusal to accept the terms of the recognition game through a 
daily counter-assertion and enactment of alternative, grounded 
ways of life and sovereignties.21 The focus here is on resurgence, as 
opposed to recognition, and on the means necessary for rebuilding 
Indigenous communities on terms not defined in advance by the 
state and its agencies.22 For the purposes of this essay, I believe the 
important insight we gain from these critiques is the decentering 
of the recognition game as primary to the formulation of our 
understanding of the interdependency between legitimacy and 
justice in liberal political orders. But then what should replace it?
POWER AND JUSTIFICATION
A political theory that took these critiques of the liberal recognition 
game seriously would need to conceptualise liberal settler states 
very differently. They should be seen as being composed of 
constellations of normative orders that overlap and intersect in 
complex ways both above and below the state, as opposed to 
a singular people or sovereign.23 And it should take seriously the 
historical and political legacies of the way those normative orders 
came into being and the interactions between them over time.
A deeper challenge is to the ostensible universalism of the 
metaethical and normative structure underlying many of the 
dominant modes of political theorising today. Human rights 
and social justice theorists often struggle to see the extent to 
which embracing and responding to the critique of colonialism 
entails leaving moral or political universalism behind. Of course, 
one could argue that the most powerful critiques of colonialism 
depend on forms of ethical and political universalism, which ought 
to provide the terms in which to reject the racist and imperialist 
justifications for the subjection of Indigenous peoples. That 
shift, however, can often seem glib in light of the historical and 
structural features of global politics.
The challenge, therefore, is to put the question of power at 
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often been missing, given the dominant focus on recognition. 
Justice is not only a matter of how resources ought to be 
distributed, but also how they came about and how decisions 
about allocations should be made. The shift is, therefore, from a 
focus on recognition to a focus on power, and thus to relations 
of justification. Despite the focus on justification in recent 
contemporary political theory, it’s still not clear that liberal 
political theorists, broadly construed, really do put this question 
at the heart of their approach. In relation to the constitutional 
and political situation of Indigenous peoples in Australia, I believe 
it shifts the onus of justification from resting almost entirely with 
Indigenous communities, to one (at the very least) equally shared 
with the state. Let me try to explain.
The first question of liberal justice is indeed the question of power, 
for it is the promise of liberal political orders that an individual’s 
basic freedom and equality can be reconciled with subjection to 
political authority. Hence the promise of the justification game 
and the appeal to the existence of something like an underlying 
‘right to justification’. This is the signature move of Rainer Forst’s 
work, for example, but builds upon similar claims present to 
differing extents in the work of John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon, 
Jeremy Waldron, Jurgen Habermas, Nancy Fraser, Seyla Benhabib 
and others.24 Once again, there is an appeal to an underlying 
notion of respect for the autonomy of persons, but now on the 
basis of their ‘right to justification’. That is, to the recursive general 
principle that every norm appealed to in order to legitimise the 
use of force must claim to be reciprocally and generally valid, 
and therefore needs to be justified by reciprocally and generally 
non-rejectable reasons. Reciprocity is required in the sense of 
both content and reasons: I can’t claim rights or resources that 
are denied to others and I can’t simply impose my reasons on 
others in making those claims. Generality is required in the sense 
that the reasons for accepting those norms need to be shareable 
among all persons affected.25 The underlying normative ground 
here is the moral demand for respect of each other’s moral and 
political autonomy as a reason-giving and reason-receiving being, 
living in a community of similarly constituted agents.
In political terms, this translates into a right to justification for 
all individuals, on terms they couldn’t reasonably reject, of 
those exercises of power that affect their most vital interests 
and concerns. Power needs to be construed broadly here. It 
can be put to good use or bad, depending on the context. And 
it can be exercised both in the physical sense—I prevent you 
from leaving the room by locking the door—and in the ‘space 
of reasons’: that is, the power to shape the frameworks within 
which the legitimacy of certain social and political relations are 
determined and justified.
This returns us to the discussion of the interdependency between 
legitimacy and justice. The focus on relations of power shaping 
both my freedom and the ‘space of reasons’ within which power is 
justified can help us understand the deep and systematic nature of 
the injustices that characterise Indigenous/state relations.
Now, there are complex debates about the nature of justification 
that we can’t explore here. But at the heart of the underlying 
conception of normativity upon which this conception rests is 
the idea that the validity (or bindingness) of norms is grounded 
in a form of practical deliberation among equals (as opposed 
to some external source). A norm is valid to the extent that it 
withstands a certain kind of justificatory procedure. There are, 
of course, elaborate and sophisticated accounts of the kind of 
justificatory procedures required to meet the appropriate threshold; 
for example, in the work of Habermas, Scanlon and Forst. These 
influential neo-Kantian approaches seek to establish the validity of 
a procedure that avoids both moral particularlism and dogmatism: 
we can’t appeal to an underlying conception of the good that 
everyone already accepts, or to an external set of pre-ordained 
interests or needs. Instead, we have to construct the appropriate 
terms of our fundamental moral and political relations collectively, 
from the ground up, respecting each other’s fundamental freedom 
and equality at each step in the process.
However, it’s also true that there is a limit to what justification can 
do. The source of normativity of the justificatory procedure itself is, 
more often than not, presumed. Forst, for example, following Kant, 
accepts that, in the end, there are limits to our being able to justify 
the normativity of justification; he argues it is implicit in the way we 
grasp the nature of practical reason itself.26 In other words, and very 
crudely, it’s tied to what it means to be a competent moral agent, 
living with other similarly situated agents and needing to justify 
claims made to them in morally appropriate ways.
Of course, this invites the charges of circularity and arbitrariness 
that the neo-Kantian tradition has long sought to avoid. I will leave 
this critique aside here. The key point, for our purposes, is that the 
ground of this form of normativity is modeled on ‘our’ practices 
and conceptions of practical reason. And this returns us to the 
question of power, as well as the legacies of historic injustices, 
such as colonialism. It’s not that the project of (re)constructing 
the ground of normativity is in itself impossible. Rather, it’s the 
challenge of redeeming this mode of normativity in ways that 
stay true to its own aspirations in light of the complex histories 
of the development of political communities. Practical reasoning, 
however else we might conceive of it, is a social practice.27 It has 
a history. And that means that there is always the possibility (and 
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be—shaped by various relations of subordination and domination 
that often evade our extant conceptual and justificatory schemes.
CONCLUSION
What does this mean for the constitutional recognition of 
Indigenous peoples in the Australian Constitution? I think there are 
at least three important lessons to be drawn from the arguments 
above.
First of all, the nature of the interdependency between the 
legitimacy and justice of a political order requires that we are 
constantly subjecting both the principles and practices of our 
constitutional and political order to justificatory challenge. Any 
form of constitutional recognition needs also to be complemented 
with an ongoing process of negotiation and engagement with the 
relevant political entities representative of the complex community 
of Indigenous peoples in Australia. Thus any form of constitutional 
recognition is fundamentally incomplete, just because it can only 
ever be part of what it means to establish just relations between 
the state and Indigenous peoples. An important corollary of this 
argument (sometimes missed by critics of liberal legitimacy) is that 
settler states that began with injustice are not thereby condemned 
to remain unjust. But this is only possible if they remain open 
to processes of critical reflection and challenge regarding the 
outcomes our institutions produce, and the standing and agency 
of the constituent peoples that make up that political order.
Second, what recent Indigenous political theory has made vividly 
clear is the extent to which we are often blind to those structures 
of domination that shape our political practices and the theories 
we use to justify them. And this can mean that the forms of 
mutual justification envisaged by Habermas or Forst, and the 
forms of mutual recognition as envisaged by Taylor and Honneth, 
are often rendered cognitively and juridically impossible from 
the perspective of Indigenous peoples.28 The dominant focus on 
recognition, in particular, needs to be dislodged and a greater 
attention paid to the ways in which current social and political 
arrangements manifest distinct forms of unjustified exercises of 
power. And so another thing we learn from Indigenous political 
theory is that our political community is always a constellation of 
normative orders, as opposed to one in which the questions of 
sovereignty and authority have already been answered. This then 
raises the acute challenge of how we understand and justify the 
terms of engagement, mediation and adjudication between these 
different orders.29
Finally, a deep, underlying question to this whole discussion is the 
extent to which any political community can be forged in ways that 
do not entail an incessant desire for mastery—either of humans 
over each other, or of humans over nature (or indeed both). Of 
course, the neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian accounts of political 
association that still inform so much of contemporary political 
theory proclaim this as their ultimate end as well. But the history of 
liberal colonialism demonstrates how that promise is, more often 
than not, experienced by so many, especially minority groups, as 
colossal bad faith.
But then what kind of politics of hope does this leave us with? In 
one sense, the global structures of liberal sovereignty and capital 
might seem so entrenched, and based on such flagrant violations 
of liberalism’s self-understanding, that Indigenous peoples can’t be 
expected to play in that game anymore, given the meagre returns 
to date. Thus one response, mentioned above, has been a focus on 
Indigenous ‘resurgence’ that attempts to stand outside of liberal 
democratic practices altogether. And it is no surprise that this is an 
increasingly attractive option for many Indigenous theorists and 
activists. However, even with resurgence, and a turn towards the 
building of alternative normative worlds, there will be a need for 
common concepts to structure relations between the complex, 
interconnected communities that make up our political order. For 
this reason, a project focused on attempting to re-conceptualise 
our concepts of legitimacy and justice, in the full light of our colonial 
past, is still worth pursuing.
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Since time immemorial Aboriginal people have been the continuing 
custodians of this land now known as Australia. This fact cannot be 
disputed. Yet within the Australian Constitution, the very system that 
governs us, Aboriginal history is invisible. 
 
Why can’t you see me?
 
I pose this most personal qu stion to provoke all Australians who live 
under the Constitution without question, including myself.
 
Taking away the bureaucracy and political jargon from this exercise, 
I connect with the human side of this story, the relevance and the 
impact that this system has on me as an Aboriginal Australian. In 
my work, I transition through all the emotions I have personally 
experienced when noting my reaction to the invisibility of Aboriginal 
people in the Constitution: from questioning, animosity, stupidity 
and ignorance to anger, worthlessness, sadness and diminished. 
I internalise these emotions which I allow to escape as a physical 
manifestation. 
 
The magnitude of changing the Constitution feels overwhelming 
and almost impossible; it has nothing to do with factual information 
but everything to do with people’s perceptions and voting power. I 
symbolise this by taking lead from the western quote ‘talking to a 
brick wall’ where there is really no point to my actions. 
 
In the here and now, there is still no resolution, we have no clear 
direction forward and whichever path we travel it will be a long and 
arduous journey during which time I will still remain invisible.
 
Why can’t you see me?
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